A recent meta-analysis has indicated that environmental quality and variability can influence whether offspring begging and parental responses to these signals are motivated by offspring need or offspring quality. We create a model to verify and apply evolutionary logic to this hypothesis. We determine the ecological and social conditions under which species signal and respond to need in favorable environments and quality in poor environments. The environmental conditions that favor this shift are widest when signaling costs and differences in quality between offspring are moderate. Low relatedness between siblings coupled with high signaling costs, as well as moderate relatedness between siblings coupled with low signaling costs, allow for the shift between signals of need and signals of quality to occur in more volatile environments. Furthermore, only species whose offspring are highly dependent on parents for survival are not expected to use both signals of need and of quality. Ultimately, this shift between signaling need and signaling quality is the result of high-quality offspring benefiting more from meager amounts of parental provisioning, whereas low-quality offspring have most to gain when parents can contribute more substantially. We show that this differential benefit of resources depends substantially upon offspring fitness as functions of parental investments, a variable which lacks both diversity and biological realism in previous theoretical approaches. We then use this work to reassess previous theory on signals of need and of quality.
INTRODUCTION
It is common throughout the animal kingdom for offspring to solicit resources from parents via auditory or visual signals called begging (Kilner and Johnstone 1997; Caro et al. 2016) . Although begging behavior has been extensively investigated, both theoretical and empirical studies have led to little consensus regarding the evolutionary purposes of signaling and the explanations for parental response strategies to begging behavior. The 2 most commonly proposed theories to explain signaling behavior are 1) the signal of need (SoN) hypothesis (Godfray 1991) , which posits that offspring with lower reproductive value will beg more and will be preferentially fed by their parents, and 2) the signal of quality (SoQ) hypothesis (Zahavi 1975; Grafen 1990) , which proposes that offspring with higher reproductive value can better afford the costs of begging and parents will allocate more resources to these young because the survival of offspring in better condition may translate to greater reproductive value.
Both SoN and SoQ rely on the assumption that offspring are more aware of their reproductive value than their parents are in the absence of signals. It is plausible that begging instead conveys only proximate information, as outlined by the signal of hunger hypothesis proposed by Mock et al. (2011) . Although SoN and SoQ are neither mutually exclusive nor the only theories proposed to explain signaling behavior, they are the most prominent and are frequently compared with little consensus (Cotton et al. 1999; Grodzinski et al. 2011; Mock et al. 2011; Wright 2011) .
Most previous theoretical work either assumes or claims to validate SoN over SoQ (Mock et al. 2011 ), in part due to the misguided assumption that parents are always trying to raise all their offspring to independence (Mock et al. 2011; Caro et al. 2016 ). Yet many empirical studies seem to support SoQ (Schwagmeyer and Mock 2008; Dugas 2009; Mock 2009; Caro et al. 2016) , particularly in populations that experience frequent brood reduction. This discrepancy is exacerbated by the fact that empirical literature suggests that strategies involving begging and reactions to begging are largely species-dependent: in certain species, parents provision disproportionately large amounts of resources toward the smallest and seemingly the most needy offspring, whereas in other species the largest offspring are preferentially fed by parents, sometimes without any regard to offspring begging behavior (Caro et al. 2016; Mock 2016) . It has been suggested (Mock et al. 2011 ) that neither the SoN hypothesis nor the SoQ hypothesis is alone capable of explaining and predicting the begging behavior found in nature and that certain species appear to beg to signal need whereas others beg to signal quality.
More recently, it has been demonstrated that begging behavior and parental responses differ significantly between species (Caro et al. 2016; Mock 2016) . A thorough meta-analysis of avian species has demonstrated that, at least in some birds, the way in which parents respond to begging may actually depend on environmental conditions. In more stable environments, resources are abundant and so retention of entire broods is likely, and consequently parents feed in accordance to offspring need. Conversely, in unpredictable and poor environments, limited resources means it is frequently impossible to ensure the survival of an entire brood, and so parents fare better by feeding offspring that are in the best condition to secure the survival of the greatest number of offspring (Caro et al. 2016; Mock 2016) . However, the attractive argument that environmental variation is sufficient in explaining the between-and within-species variation of SoN and SoQ systems has not yet been rigorously tested by theory. It is further unclear how the shift between SoN and SoQ can be influenced by ecological factors, such as the cost of begging, and social factors, including relatedness between offspring.
Here, we create a simple model to confirm that certain species may employ either SoN and SoQ depending on environmental conditions. We then identify the environmental conditions that favor the shift between SoN and SoQ and examine how certain social and ecological factors can influence this shift. We then discuss the implications of our findings on the debate between the SoN and SoQ hypotheses.
METHODS
Our primary goal is to create the simplest model capable of analyzing possible shifts between SoN and SoQ caused by environmental variation. To do so, we construct a modified version of the 3-player evolutionary game found in Wild et al. (2017) . Consider a parent that has one high-quality offspring and one low-quality offspring in each generation. Offspring quality is cryptic (see Appendix for an extension of this model that relaxes this assumption). Any differences in quality could be the result of asynchronous hatching, which can heavily influence egg size, among other factors proven to influence growth (Maddox and Weatherhead 2008) .
Suppose that at the end of each generation the parent has collected a divisible resource (see Appendix for a version of the model with indivisible resources) which it must distribute between the 2 offspring. Since parents are unable to distinguish between the quality of offspring, they do not know how much of the resource they should allocate to each offspring. However, offspring may use signals that indicate their quality, and this can be used to guide the parent's provisioning strategy. It is assumed that parents distribute resources in a manner that is optimal for their own inclusive fitness; the parent is better able to do this if they can identify the quality difference between offspring. As is standard, it is assumed that signals may be costly to produce (Grafen 1990; Godfray and Parker 1992) .
The family resides in a volatile environment, meaning resource availability depends significantly on environmental conditions. The parent can collect amount g h of this indivisible resource under good environmental conditions, but obtains only g g l h
< under poor environmental conditions. Here, the terms "good" and "poor" are strictly relative: good environments are favorable relative to poor environments, but our results will view scenarios in which even good environments have scarce resources, and others in which even poor environments have an abundance of resources. Parents can recognize the quality of environmental conditions, but not until after they lay their eggs. Consequently, the parent always lays 2 eggs at the beginning of each generation-many species of bird do not lay or hatch eggs in the same clutch at the same time, often hypothesized as a method of efficiently eliminating clutch sizes that are too large to maintain during poor ecological conditions (Lack 1947 (Lack , 1954 .
The 2 offspring can differ in terms of how their fitness changes as a function of resources provisioned to them: high-quality and low-quality offspring have fitness functions f g h ( ) and f g l ( ) , respectively, where g is the amount resources provided. Since signaling may be costly for the signaler, the fitness of the signaler is subtracted by some fixed cost, c (see Table 1 for a list of variables used in the main text).
We assume that offspring can distinguish the quality of their environment, either by direct observation or indirectly based on the parent's behavior. They can use this information when deciding whether to signal, a decision that is assumed to be made by offspring simultaneously. If both or neither offspring signal, it is assumed the parent is unable to distinguish between the quality of the offspring, and so must divide resources in a manner that maximizes the parent's own inclusive fitness without any information about offspring quality; as it turns out, the optimal strategy in these cases is for the parent to divide resources evenly between the 2 offspring (see Appendix). If only 1 offspring signals, the parent is assumed to be able to differentiate between the 2 offspring and uses the information about offspring quality to distribute resources optimally with respect to the parent's own inclusive fitness. Note that the begging strategies of each offspring can change depending on current environmental conditions-choices in good-quality environments may differ from choices in poor-quality environments.
For each environmental condition-good and poor-there are 4 possible outcomes for the scenario described (see Figure 1 ). There is a certain payoff for each offspring in each of the different possible outcomes. In this model, the payoff is measured in terms of the total inclusive fitness each offspring has in each outcome. The inclusive fitness payoff corresponding to each outcome and for each individual is calculated by setting the relatedness between parent and offspring and the relatedness between offspring to ½ < R < 1 and ¼ <r < R, respectively. We are, in particular, interested in finding conditions that favor the Nash equilibrium profile under which the signal of need is adopted in one environmental condition but signal of quality is employed in another. We identified the conditions in which only the low-quality offspring signals and is given a greater share of the divisible resource in good environments (SoN), and only the high-quality offspring signals and is given a greater share of resources in poor environments (SoQ). This equilibrium, which captures the outcome in which the information conveyed by signals shifts from need to quality based on environmental conditions, is henceforth referred to as the facultative outcome. The payoffs for each individual in each outcome j, as well as the conditions in which the facultative outcome is a Nash equilibrium, are listed in Appendix. To examine the stability of the facultative outcome, we must first select biologically realistic fitness functions for the 2 offspring. As fitness as a function of resources for many species is best modeled as sigmoidal (Rubenstein 1982; Whitlock et al. 2007 ), we set f e t = + -1 1 / ( ) , where t represents the state of the offspring.
We assume that the high-quality offspring has hatched early and has thus received care from the parent for a longer period than the low-quality offspring but is otherwise identical to the low-quality offspring. That is, we will assume that the fitness functions of the 2 offspring are identical, f f As we are primarily interested in investigating how environmental variability influences whether signals indicate need or quality, we set all other variables (r, c, a, and d) equal to constants, then numerically calculate (see Supplementary Material) the amount of resources available in good and poor environmental conditions, g h and g l, respectively, for which the stability conditions of the facultative outcome are met; these values will constitute the "region of stability." We analyze the influence of each parameter on the region of stability; in the Results section, we briefly discuss the results of this analysis for each parameter in turn.
RESULTS
Whenever an offspring chooses to signal, there are 2 inclusive fitness penalties. The first is the direct cost associated with signaling and the second is the indirect cost resulting from the other offspring receiving fewer resources. This second cost is influenced by the relatedness between offspring, baseline fitness of the signaler's sibling, and the amount of resources that the 2 offspring are competing over. The sole benefit of signaling is that the offspring will receive a larger share of resources, which is influenced by the baseline fitness of the signaler and the amount of resources available to the parent. Note that in this model an offspring who does not stand to receive a larger share of resources by signaling simply will not beg, as begging will only serve to alert the parent that the signaler should receive fewer resources. For the stability of the facultative outcome, the sole benefit of signaling must outweigh the 2 penalties for high-quality offspring (but not for low-quality offspring) in poor environments, and similarly the benefit must outweigh the cost for low-quality offspring (but not for high-quality offspring) in more favorable environments. Consequently, resource availability, relatedness, signaling costs, baseline fitness, and differences in offspring quality each affect whether SoQ in poor environments shifts to SoN in good environments.
Results for the stability of the facultative outcome are presented in terms of how relatedness, signaling costs, baseline fitness, and differences in offspring quality influence the range of environmental conditions that would lead to a shift between SoN and SoQ.
Relatedness between offspring
Generally, if signaling costs, c, are high, increasing relatedness, r, decreases the range of parameters of which the facultative outcome is stable (Figure 2 ). High signaling costs can completely offset the fitness gain produced by guiding the parental investment via signals, and so offspring are less inclined to beg. As relatedness increases, the greater share of resources that an offspring may acquire by signaling becomes less of a benefit, as the signaler is depriving its closer relative of resources. This is often particularly true when the difference between offspring quality, a, is small. The result is that, in both good and poor environments, both offspring are less likely to beg as relatedness increases. When signaling costs are large, higher relatedness between offspring translates to greater environmental volatility required for the stability of the facultative outcome (where volatility is measured by the minimum difference in resources in good vs. poor environments).
If the signaling costs are low, the range of environmental conditions over which the facultative outcome is stable is instead expected to be widest at moderate relatedness levels (i.e. with offspring that are full-siblings) compared with lower relatedness levels (i.e. with offspring of species where extra-pair copulation is more common). With lower relatedness, offspring experience a relatively greater gain in inclusive fitness by receiving a greater share of resources. As such, with low signaling costs, both offspring are more inclined to beg and the parent will distribute resources evenly. With higher-than-moderate relatedness, offspring lose more by taking a greater share of resource away from their closer sibling and will generally opt not to signal at all, especially when the difference in offspring quality is low. When signaling costs are low, higher relatedness between offspring means lower environmental volatility (defined above) is required for the stability of the facultative outcome.
Cost of signaling
All else being equal, increasing the costs of signaling decreases the range of environmental conditions under which the facultative outcome is stable (Figure 3 
Figure 1
Decision tree representation of the game outlined in the main text. A separate and independent game is played in good-and poor-quality environments, although the general structure of the decision tree is the same for each environment. Note that the high-quality and low-quality offspring act simultaneously and independently. Each pair of numbers refers to the outcome name assigned to the good-quality environments and poor-quality environments, respectively.
the benefit of receiving increased provisioning due to signaling is more likely to be outweighed by the higher direct costs of signaling. The shift between SoN and SoQ is possible even when signaling costs are minute provided relatedness between offspring is sufficiently high, and the low-quality (resp. high-quality) offspring benefits substantially more from provisioning in good (resp. poor) environments than its sibling. If there are absolutely no direct signaling costs, c = 0, no strict Nash equilibrium exists because, though it may be optimal for everyone if only 1 offspring begs so that the parent is able to differentiate between the 2 offspring, offspring decide whether to signal simultaneously and as such cannot coordinate which of them should signal. Cost of signaling and its effect on the amount of resources required for the facultative outcome to be stable in good environments (light gray region) and in poor environments (dark gray region). The region between the maximum amount of resources (dashed lines) and the minimum amount of resources (solid lines) constitute the amount of resources necessary for the stability of the facultative outcome. Results were generated using d = −2, a = 1, and r = 0.5. 
Baseline fitness
Given low to moderate baseline fitness levels, conditions for the stability of the facultative outcome can be met (Figure 4 ). All else being equal, if the baseline fitness of offspring is high, it is less likely that one offspring will gain substantially more than the other. The offspring are consequently less inclined to beg since the costs of begging are less likely to outweigh the benefit of directing the parent to distribute resources more optimally, particularly when relatedness between offspring is high.
The facultative outcome is also unlikely to be stable when the baseline fitness of offspring is very low. Due to the sigmoidal nature of the fitness function, very low baseline fitness levels mean that it is unlikely for one offspring to benefit significantly more than the other by receiving a greater share of resources, particularly when the resources are very limited; the difference in quality between offspring would have to be very large. The cost of begging will then deter both offspring from begging.
High-quality offspring advantage
Mathematically, both baseline fitness and high-quality offspring advantage, a, influence the offspring's conditions relative to the inflection point-where the marginal fitness benefits of increased provisioning are greatest-of the sigmoidal curve. Consequently, similar to the relationship between the stability of the facultative outcome and offspring baseline fitness, the facultative outcome is stable only when the high-quality offspring has a moderate advantage over its sibling. If the advantage is very small, it is unlikely for one offspring to gain significantly more than another from having a greater share of resources, and so bearing the cost of signaling to direct the parent's provisioning strategy is an unfavorable strategy. If the high-quality offspring advantage is sufficiently high, then the low-quality offspring will benefit more from even a small amount of resources, and so the facultative outcome will not be stable.
DISCUSSION
We have demonstrated using evolutionary game theory that environmental variation can influence signaling behavior and, in particular, is sufficient to promote signals to demonstrate need in poor environmental conditions and quality in favorable conditions, a conclusion recently suggested by empirical data (Caro et al. 2016; Mock 2016) . Ultimately, this shift may occur only if 2 basic conditions are met. First, low-quality offspring must stand to benefit much more substantially from high degrees of parental investment, whereas high-quality offspring can benefit more when potential parental investment is limited by poor environmental conditions. Whether this condition is satisfied depends on the quality and the quality differences between offspring, and the way quality changes as a function of parental investment. The second basic condition that must be satisfied is that only 1 offspring begs and is preferentially fed. Whether this condition is satisfied may be influenced by the relatedness between offspring and the inherent costs of signaling.
Our work outlines some of the specific social and ecological factors that can influence how variable environments need to be for the shift between SoN and SoQ to occur. Many of these results provide testable predictions. Our results suggest that there is a greater range of environmental conditions that favor the stability of the facultative outcome for species with moderate relatedness between siblings (e.g. full-siblings) when the cost of signaling is low compared with low relatedness (e.g. half-siblings or less) when the cost of signaling is relatively high. If both relatedness between offspring and costs of signaling are high, it is expected that the shift between SoN and SoQ would occur only in very volatile environments, whereas when signaling costs are low and relatedness is high, this shift should be readily found in more stable environments. Given that only moderate differences between offspring quality, a, allowed for the stability of the facultative outcome, we expect to see a connection between the synchronicity of offspring hatching and whether a species shifts Offspring baseline fitness and its effect on the amount of resources required for the facultative outcome to be stable in good environments (light gray region) and in poor environments (dark gray region). The region between the maximum amount of resources (dashed lines) and the minimum amount of resources (solid lines) constitutes the amount of resources necessary for the stability of the facultative outcome. Results were generated using c = 0.05, a = 1, and r = 0.5.
between SoN and SoQ depending on environmental conditions. Our results also suggest that the shift between SoN in high-quality environments and SoQ in low-quality environments will occur only in species that depend heavily upon parents at birth (i.e. baseline fitness d small). Future empirical work should examine the degree to which young are self-sufficient soon after hatching and the probability with which environmental instability facilitates the shift between SoN and SoQ.
Many species may be able to use physical proxies (cues), such as body size, to evaluate offspring quality. Compared with simply responding to signals, investigating cues may require more energy and time, thereby making it a less efficient option. We created an extension of our model (see Appendix) in which the parent has the option of investigating cues. The extension demonstrates that environmental variation can still encourage SoN to be used in poor environments and SoQ to be used in favorable environments. Qualitatively, the results of the extended model are very similar to the base model, though greater efficiency associated with using cues results in increases in the minimum baseline fitness, difference in offspring quality, and relatedness between siblings, as well as a decrease in the maximum cost of signaling, necessary for the stability of the facultative outcome. For the facultative outcome to be stable, investigating cues must be more costly than feeding according to signals or at random, otherwise the parent will always use cues as they are more reliable than signals (see Appendix).
SoN versus SoQ
Paramount to influencing whether a species uses signals to display need versus quality is the relationship between resources and the offspring's fitness levels. As shown by the relationship between the region of stability of the facultative outcome and the high-quality offspring advantage and baseline fitness, even translations of the same fitness function can dictate the nature of signaling systems. This importance of the nature of fitness functions has been largely neglected by previous research. Indeed, the very fact that both SoN and SoQ may be required to explain the begging behaviors of certain species, yet theoretical work almost exclusively validates or assumes SoN (Mock et al. 2011) , encourages a review of previous signaling theory.
Much of the recent theoretical literature, which frequently uses Godfray's (1991) seminal paper as a basis for more elaborate models (Godfray 1995; Rodriguez-Girones et al. 1998; RodriguezGirones 1999; Rodriguez-Girones et al. 2001) , is constructed around the notion that offspring use begging to signal their need to their parents. It is, therefore, prudent to revisit the construction and implications of Godfray's (1991) model. First, it should be made clear that Godfray's model does not provide evidence for SoN. Instead, Godfray builds the model under the assumption that SoN is true: he defines an offspring's need as the marginal fitness gain it experiences by obtaining more resources, and assumes that parents will provide more resources to young in "poor condition"-condition, here, being synonymous with reproductive value (Godfray 1991; Mock et al. 2011) . He then explicitly states that offspring fitness increases monotonically with respect to greater resources, and, crucially, assumes that this increase occurs at a decelerating rate. Although the former assumption is altogether reasonable, no justification is provided for the latter assumption, even though fitness functions are often modeled as being sigmoidal (Rubenstein 1982; Whitlock et al. 2007 ). The fitness function used by Godfray is then repeated in several extensions of his model (Rodriguez-Girones et al. 1998; Rodriguez-Girones 1999; Rodriguez-Girones et al. 2001) . The selection of specific functions that properly represent neither the diversity nor complexity of begging behaviors observed in nature has resulted in SoQ largely being neglected by previous theoretical models.
Previous research on SoN and SoQ have also been impeded by the definitions of need and quality. SoQ , as defined tacitly by Godfray (1991) and explicitly elsewhere (Mock et al. 2011) , effectively claims the opposite of SoN-offspring in "poor condition" will beg less and be allocated fewer resources. The largest problem with this definition is rooted in semantics, as "quality" can hold many different meanings. Most signaling theory regards quality as being the opposite of need and the same as condition and reproductive value: the greater the need of the offspring, the lower its quality, reproductive value, and condition. However, with biologically reasonable fitness functions (like the sigmoidal relationship between offspring resources and fitness used in this study), need as defined by the marginal change in the offspring's fitness with increased investment may no longer be the opposite of quality. An offspring can reasonably have higher fitness than its siblings while also standing to gain more from additional parental investment. One may even argue that quality and need are equivalent because, from the perspective of the parent, a quality investment into an offspring should naturally mean an investment into offspring that have most to benefit most from further investment. Definitions of need and quality become even less intuitive if offspring have entirely different fitness functions, as quality could refer to the potential reproductive value that an offspring possesses given unlimited provisioning. A limitation of our work is that we use a single offspring fitness function. Although this setup is sufficient to investigate the role of environmental variation in the shift between SoN and SoQ , our model lacks the predictive power that fitness functions that are modeled closely after empirical data could generate.
Our work supports Mock's (2011 Mock's ( , 2016 theory that parents are not restricted to using signals to convey only need or only quality. However, rather than parents simply being able to switch between SoN and SoQ , it may be that signals (or lack thereof) evolved to roughly indicate where along the fitness curve an offspring's condition currently resides, whereas cues (such as weight) indicate to the parent the general shape of the offspring's fitness curve. That is, as suggested by Mock 2011, the distinction between SoN and SoQ may be more artificial and certainly less useful than that previously suggested.
In our model, the cost of signaling is set to a constant that is then subtracted from the offspring's fitness. In this way, we assume that if there are any costs associated with signaling (i.e. c > 0), they are metabolic in nature and are not shared. However, signals can also draw predators to the nest (Haskell 1994; Leech and Leonard 1997) , and the cost of signaling is shared among its inhabitants. In this situation, the parent may be more encouraged to provide greater care for signalers to stop their signals. This situation is outlined by the blackmail hypothesis, for which there is some empirical support (Thompson et al. 2013) , though it has been discussed mostly via verbal arguments (Trivers 1974; Zahavi 1977) and has not been explored particularly rigorously. One crucial exception is Johnstone (1996) ; though his model does not consider increased predation as a cost of signaling, it includes only 1 offspring (therefore disallowing offspring to compete via signals) and does not consider the influence of environmental variation. An alternative response to blackmail that lacks discussion as previous theory has often operated under the assumption that parents attempt to raise all offspring (Mock et al. 2011; Caro et al. 2016 ) is the option for the parent to abandon the entire brood or even terminate and encourage the termination (i.e. via siblicide) of signalers. The relationship between the blackmail hypothesis and the signal SoN versus SoQ debate has remained unexplored. It is possible that begging does not necessarily signify need or quality in any scenario, but instead is simply used as a tool to skew the parent-offspring conflict over provisioning closer to the offspring's optimal outcome.
